大股东控制下的股权融资与掏空行为研究

Equity Financing and Tunneling under the Control of Controlling Shareholder

我国证券市场融资规律与新优序融资顺序理论不符,用大股东利益掏空行为可以合理解释。以2008-2010年间增发、配股、债务融资的上市公司为样本,建立多元回归模型实证检验大股东控制、股权融资偏好与利益掏空行为的内在关系。研究结果表明:在第一大股东控制下实施股权融资的上市公司其盈余管理幅度、关联交易水平与资金占用程度更高,导致公司市场价值更低;大股东利用股权融资行为实现了控制权隐性收益和财富转移。

The fact of financing preference in Chinese securities market is in contrast with the new Pecking Order Theory, but costs theories can not give a reasonable explanation. Using the samples of listed companies in 2008-2010, the paper studies the relationship between equity financing and tunneling under the control of the controlling shareholder. Empirical research shows that： when the equity financing is carried out by the controlling shareholder, the listing corporation＇s earnings management amplitude, level of related party transactions and capital occupation degree are higher, but the market value of the company is lower. The controlling shareholder achieves the purpose of controlling recessive income and wealth transfer by equity financing.