银行业竞争与货币政策调控效果——一个自然实验框架下的分析

Banking Competition and the Regulation Effects of Monetary Policy——An Analysis in the Framework of Natural Experiment

本文基于银行业竞争差异的视角实证检验了中国货币政策紧缩对企业债务融资的区域调控效果。研究发现:在货币紧缩之后,银行业竞争程度较低区域的上市公司的银行借款对货币政策的变动更敏感,而且这种效应在非国有上市公司样本中更显著,但是在国有上市公司样本中则不明显;进一步研究还发现,货币紧缩导致银行业竞争程度较低区域的非国有上市公司的银行借款相对于国有上市公司下降的幅度更大,而在银行业竞争程度较高的区域则不存在这种效应。研究结论表明,银行业竞争程度的提高有助于非国有上市公司抑制货币紧缩的不利影响。

From the perspective of banking competition difference, this paper empirically examines the regional regulation ef- fects of China＇s tightening monetary policy on debt financing of enterprises. It is found that, after the monetary tightening, the listed companies that barrow money from banks in regions where the level of banking competition is lower are more sensitive to the monetary policy. This effect is more obvious in the samples of the non-state-owned listed companies, but it is not so in the samples of the state-owned listed companies. The further analysis shows that, in lower-competition regions, the monetary tight- ening leads to a greater decrease in money borrowed by the non-state-owned companies from banks than that by the state-owned companies, but it doesn＇t has such an effect in higher-competition regions. The above results show that the increase in banking competition will help the non-state-owned listed companies reduce the negative impacts of monetary tightening.