并购公司管理层业绩预告的披露策略研究

An Empirical Study of the Disclosure Strategies of Management Earnings Forecasts by Acquiring Companies during Mergers and Acquisitions Events

本文对中国沪深两市A股上市公司2007-2011年并购前管理层业绩预告的披露策略进行研究。研究发现,并购前管理层会策略性地发布好消息业绩预告、高精度业绩预告和乐观业绩预告;并购前强制性披露公司与自愿性披露公司在管理层业绩预告披露策略上存在差异,自愿性披露较强制性披露发布更多好消息,但是披露精度较低,并且倾向于披露悲观业绩预告。研究结论有利于投资者理性评估管理层业绩预告,有利于证券市场监管者完善管理层业绩预告制度。

This paper finds that the management would strategically disclose good, precise point and optimistic earnings fore- casts before the mergers and acquisitions events. It also finds that there is difference between the management earnings fore- casts disclosure strategies by the voluntary disclosure companies and that by the mandatory disclosure companies. In detail, the voluntary disclosure companies tend to disclose more good, imprecise and pessimistic earnings forecasts than the mandatory disclosure companies. These findings are valuable for the investors to rationally assess the management earnings forecasts, and for the financial market regulators to improve the management earnings forecasts policy.