国际环境公约稳定性的重复博弈分析

An Analysis of the Stability of International Environmental Agreements Based on Repeated Games

国际环境公约的有效性包括减排有效性与社会福利有效性两个方面,强调一个有效的国际环境公约在减排的前提下提高社会福利的功能。然而,基于Carraro&Siniscalco 1993和Hoel 1992的同时博弈模型,本文发现全合作是有效的却是不稳定的。将他们的模型拓展为无限期的重复博弈后,发现基于远期收益考虑的情况之下,一个全合作的国际环境公约是可以被子博弈完美均衡所支持的。另外,在证明中,本文也给出了折现因子的下界。

In this paper, the efficiency of International Environmental Agreements（IEAs） is defined in terms of emission reducing and maximizing joint social welfare. It emphasizes lEAs＇ improvement on the social welfare without increasing the pollution, For the simultaneous model in Carraro ＆ Sinisealco（1993） and Hoel （ 1992）, we show that the outcome of full cooperation is efficient but not stable. When the benchmark model is extended to infinitely repeated game, we show that full cooperation lower hound of the discount factor is also provided. is supported by subgame perfect equilibrium. And, the