奖励报酬合同下的农户质量安全努力水平研究

Research on the Effort Level of the Quality and Safety from Farmers under the Incentive Payment Contract

为保障农产品质量安全,在合作社为农户提供质量安全奖励报酬合同的条件下,通过构建数理模型分析了风险中性和风险规避农户的努力水平决策及其影响因素。结果表明,最低基本质量安全水平、农户努力的有效程度、不同农户间的竞争强度和其他竞争性农户的努力水平都对农户努力具有正向影响,而边际奖励报酬、农户获得质量安全奖励的临界质量安全水平及其风险规避度对努力的影响,都依据满足条件的不同而不同。据此,提出合作社根据不同农户风险偏好特征提供相应奖励报酬合同等建议。

In order to guarantee the quality and safety of agricultural products, this paper builds the mathematical modds to analyze the decision of the effort level and its influential factors for the risk - neutral farmers and the risk - averse farmers, when the cooperative provides the incentive payment contract for the farmers. The resuhs show that the lowest basic quality and safety level, the effective degree of effort, the intensity of competition between different farmers, and the effort level of the other farmer all have positive effect on the effort level of the quality and safety, but the marginal incentive payment, the critical quality and safety of the payment obtained, and the risk - aversion have different effect on the effort level according to the different conditions. It gives some suggestions such as the cooperative providing the corresponding incentive payment contract with different risk preference of farmers.