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论戴维特对因果论的推进 被引量:1

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摘要 名称语义研究始终是分析哲学研究的热点。最近十年间,因果论的代表人物克里普克和普特南先后获得号称哲学诺贝尔奖的“肖克奖”。但是,因果论将其关于专名的结论类推到通名抑或普遍词项,不断遭到批判。戴维特(Michael Devitt)是克里普克的同事,如同赫胥黎之于达尔文,他始终在积极为克里普克因果论辩护,是因果论不折不扣的旗手。最近,有学者反对因果论在其理论建构中以直觉为前提的做法,首先出来为因果论辩护的也是戴维特。然而,戴维特理解的因果论有不同于克里普克因果论之处。除了清算描述论的问题,戴维特对克里普克因果论做出推进,并明确提出综合描述因素的因果论方式解释自然种类词项的语义。毋宁说,戴维特给出了一种新的因果论。
出处 《哲学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第7期98-103,共6页 Philosophical Trends
基金 国家哲学社会科学基金项目"基于逻辑视野的认知研究"(11BZX062) "现代逻辑视野的认知研究(11AZD057)" 江苏师范大学科研基金项目"自然种类词项指称机制研究"(12XWR011)阶段性成果
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参考文献10

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二级参考文献20

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共引文献8

同被引文献10

  • 1NADO J. Philosphical expertise [ J ]. Philosophy compass, 2014(9) :631 -641.
  • 2MOLYNEUX B. New arguments that philosophers don' t treat intuitions as evidence [ J ]. Metaphilosophy, 2014 ( 3 ) : 0026 - 1068.
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  • 5DEVITY M. Ignorance of language[ M ]. Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press ,2006.
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  • 9刘小涛.对德维特“无知论题”的批判性考察[J].自然辩证法研究,2010,26(7):19-24. 被引量:1
  • 10周玉华.语言直觉的判断功能[J].现代外语,2013,36(3):262-268. 被引量:3

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