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国际贸易视角下的虚拟水贸易博弈分析 被引量:1

Game analysis of virtual water trade from perspective of international trade
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摘要 全球水资源短缺问题日益严峻,为探求解决水资源问题的新思路,采用博弈论中的囚徒困境模型,分别对水资源博弈和国际贸易博弈进行独立分析。应用虚拟水贸易的思想将水资源问题的解决与国际贸易行为相联系,构建虚拟水贸易的博弈模型。对2个独立博弈的分析表明,单独的博弈易陷入"囚徒困境",对关联后合作利益的分析表明,博弈双方合作利益的大小及利益的分配是虚拟水贸易博弈能否形成合作纳什均衡的关键。水资源与国际贸易存在博弈均衡差异及收益互补性,虚拟水贸易的施行将会使双方在合作方面取得更大的收益,从而增加突破囚徒困境的可能性。由此分析得出将两者捆绑在一起要比单纯的解决水资源问题更加有效。 The shortage of the global water resources is becoming more and more serious.To explore a new way to solve the shortage problem of water resources,the game of water resources and the game of international trade are analyzed respectively using the prisoner s dilemma in the game theory model.A game model for the virtual water is established by combing the solution of the shortage of water resources with the behaviors of international trade.The independent analysis of the 2 games shows that a single game is easy to fall into the prisoner s dilemma.The comparative analysis of the interests they get after the combination shows that the key to form the Nash equilibrium is the size of cooperative interests and the distribution of their interests.Water resources and the international trade games have equilibrium differences and complementary returns.The implementation of virtual water trade will make both parties achieve even greater gains in terms of their cooperation so as to increase the possibility of breakthrough the prisoner s dilemma.Therefore,the combined way of the game of water resources and the game of international trade is more efficient than the simple solution of the shortage problem of water resources.
作者 王春月 李锋
机构地区 河海大学商学院
出处 《水利经济》 2013年第4期23-26,74,共4页 Journal of Economics of Water Resources
关键词 水资源博弈 国际贸易 虚拟水贸易 合作的纳什均衡 water resources game international trade virtual water trade cooperative Nash equilibrium
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参考文献7

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