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银行与企业资金担保链:抽贷门槛与风险传染 被引量:9

Bank and Enterprise Funds Guarantee Chain:Loan-Withdrawing Threshold and Risk Contagion
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摘要 通过从银行抽贷门槛的视角对企业资金担保链风险传染机理进行探寻,结果显示:首先,抽贷门槛的高低与早期银行数量、早期银行取出资金的数量负相关。当企业处于较好状况时,安全资产越多,则抽贷门槛越高;反之,当企业处于较差状况时,安全资产越多,则抽贷门槛越低。其次,当企业处于较好状况时,抽贷门槛越高,银行得到的收益会越多;反之,当企业处于较差状况时,抽贷门槛越高,则银行得到的收益会越少。再次,企业资金担保链的风险传染通过资金担保数量、抽贷门槛两条路径表现出来。 This paper explores the risk contagion mechanism of enterprise funds guarantee chain from the perspective of the loan-withdrawing threshold,the results are as follows.Firstly,the threshold of withdrawing loan has negative correlation with the number of early banks and their amounts of withdrawing funds.When enterprises are in better conditions,the more the safe assets,the higher the threshold of withdrawing loan will be;conversely,when enterprises are in worse conditions,the more the safe assets,the lower the threshold of withdrawing loan will be.Secondly,when the enterprises are in a better situation,the higher the threshold of withdrawing loan is,the more the banks will gain;conversely,when the enterprises are in worse situation,the higher the threshold of withdrawing loan is,the less the banks will gain.Thirdly,the risk contagion of enterprise funds guarantee chain can be seen through the two paths of the amount of guaranteed fund and the threshold of withdrawing loan.
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第7期55-66,共12页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 浙江省社会科学规划课题"浙江企业资金担保链的风险运行机制与监管路径建构"(12YD19YB)
关键词 企业资金担保链 银行 抽贷门槛 风险传染 enterprise funds guarantee chain bank the threshold of withdrawing loan risk contagion
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