摘要
文章运用1998—2007年中国制造业企业微观数据,考察了不同所有制企业的信贷约束,发现银行更偏爱国有企业,对非国有企业无论是从贷款额度、融资成本,还是债务担保能力、融资条件都实行了严格的控制和约束。运用Blinder-Oaxaca回归分解法检验了信贷资金配置差异的主要原因,发现所有制歧视导致的不合理部分能够解释总差异的50%以上。在进一步考虑了不同时期的信贷政策差异、分地区及分企业规模的研究发现,不合理部分比重依然很高,即银行信贷资金配置差异主要由不合理的禀赋外因素决定。本文结论为完善银行企业信贷政策提供了有益参考。
Using the China's manufacturing firms' data during 1998 -2007 to analyze the loan constraint of different ownership enterprises, this paper finds that the banks prefer state - owned enterprise to non - state - owned enterprises. No matter loans quota, financing costs, or debt guarantees, financing conditions are implemented by strict controlling and constraining for non - state - owned enterprises. Applying techniques of Blinder- Oaxaca regression and decomposition, this paper examines the main reason for capital allocation differences. The results show that the unexplained proportion is more than 50%. After further investigating different periods of the credit policy, three area and enterprises scale, we find that the unexplained proportion is still high. This article provides beneficial implications to improve the banks' credit policy.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
2013年第6期49-61,共13页
South China Journal of Economics
关键词
信贷资金配置
禀赋差异
所有制歧视
Loan Allocation
Endowment Differences
Ownership Discrimination.