摘要
在《罗尔斯的问题意识》一文中,周保松梳理了罗尔斯政治哲学的一些理论脉络,并对后者的契约论提出了批评。在他看来,罗尔斯对正义原则的证成需要诉诸原初状态下立约者的理性自利,因而与其理论中的其他部分产生了矛盾,并削弱了这一理论的吸引力。对这一缺陷的解决之道,是将理性自利的考虑排除出去,并单凭隐含在原初状态之后的道德预设来推导出正义原则。然而,这种解决方案是不必要的,因为对自利因素的依赖并不与罗尔斯正义论的其他部分产生冲突,也不会减少其吸引力。这种解决方案也是不可能成功的,因为差异原则不可能仅仅从特定的道德前提中推论出来。
Chow Po Chung argues that there is an inconsistency in Rawls ' theory about the motivations of the par- ties in the original position. He claims that if those parties are driven by self - interest behind the veil of ignorance, then we cannot expect them to constrain themselves with moral principles after the veil is moved, and this makes Rawls' theory less plausible. The solution he provides is to derive the principles of justice solely from the moral pre -conditions given by Rawls. However, this solution is unnecessary, for there is nothing inconsistent in Rawls' ar- gument. It is also unsatisfactory, for Chow is unable to derive the difference principle without the device of Rawl- sian original position.
出处
《烟台大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期12-16,共5页
Journal of Yantai University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费"古今政治理论中的自由与正义"(NKZXB1261)
关键词
差异原则
理性自利
罗尔斯
契约论
同意
difference principle
rational self - interest
Rawls
social contract theory
consent