尊严的理念悖论及其宪法消解

Dignity's Philosophical Paradox and Its Constitutional Settlement: Reading Kant again

在哲学史上,康德开创性地提出了"人是目的而非仅仅是手段"层面上的人之尊严命题,然而,正是这一尊严观支撑了他的报应主义死刑的法律立场,由此形成了康德尊严理念的悖论。坚持平等至上,或者说对于平等的偏爱和过度强调,是悖论的认识论根由。二战后德国《基本法》对于人的尊严的宪法确认及其相关司法实践,在很大程度上消解了康德悖论。中国宪法的尊严规范应该定位于尊严的宪法价值而非任何意义上的哲学判断。

Kant put forward a creative proposition in philosophical history, in which human dignity should be existed as an end, but never as a mean barely. However, it was this dignity＇ s idea that supported Kant＇s retributive death penalty theory in the field of criminal law, which resulted in Kant＇ s paradox of dignity idea. The cognitive root of this paradox was that Kant persisted with his view of equal supremacy, in other words, Kant treated the equality with favor and too much emphasis. After the Second World War, Germany established the human dignity as the constitutional status in the Fundament Law and put this constitutional principle into judicial practices, which dispelled Kant＇ s paradox to a great extent. In China, the dignity＇ s constitutional nature should be understood as its constitutional value, not as its any philosophical judgment.