摹状词与实在论——罗素、斯特劳森和蒯因的实在论之比较

Description and Realism:A Comparison among Realisms of Russell,Strawson and Quine

罗素的摹状词理论取消了摹状词的指称功能,只保留专名的指称功能,由此罗素从柏拉图和梅农的共相实在论转向殊相实在论。在罗素把亲知作为专名的重要特征之后,他把普通专名当作缩略的摹状词,只保留自我中心指示词的专名地位,并由此转向主观经验论甚至唯我论。斯特劳森从日常语言学派的立场出发,批评了罗素的摹状词理论从而坚守殊相实在论的阵地。蒯因从罗素的摹状词理论得出一个重要结论即"存在是约束变项的值",由此进入多元实在论。

Russell’s theory of description cancels the referential function of a description while it retains the referential function to a proper name.Thereby,Russell turns into the particulars realism from Platonic and Meinong’s universals realism.After he takes acquaintance as the important characteristic of a proper name,Russell attributes all of common proper names to abbreviated descriptions except a fewer egocentricity words only which are the true proper names.Russell turns thus into subjective empiricism,even to solipsism.Strawson criticizes Russell’s theory of description from the stand of school of daily language and holds fast to the particulars realist position.Quine draws an important conclusion that to be is to be a value of a bound variable,and turns thus into pluralistic realism.