新制度经济学视角下我国政府间财政关系及路径选择

Inter-governmental Fiscal Relationships in China and Paths of Choice:a New Institutional Economics Perspective

在"财权上移,事权下移"的政府间财政格局下,中央和地方的纵向财政失衡已经成为我国政府间财政关系的客观存在。中央和地方两级政府巨大的财政偏好,预算外资金、行政层级过多,以及中央和地方的隐性博弈等非制度化因素扭曲了央地财政关系。在重启财政体制改革的背景下,新制度经济学作为解释现实经济的重要理论,通过完善政府间财政关系的正式制度,可以从根本上提供"治本"的良方。

The traditional pattern whereby the central government takes control of public finance whereas the local governments are saddled with the responsibility of executing directives from the central government has created imbalance in China’s inter-governmental fiscal relations.Center-region fiscal relations has been distorted by the existence of extra-budgetary funds and excessive number of administrative layers,and by the enormous fiscal appetite of and hidden tug-of-war between the two levels of governments.New Institutional Economics,as a significant economic theory that shed light on real problems in economic life,may provide essential assistance in addressing structural woes in inter-governmental fiscal relationships.