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内在心理偏好、外在文化规范与团队合作 被引量:3

内在心理偏好、外在文化规范与团队合作
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摘要 针对团队合作难以实现的问题,采用行为博弈论方法研究了员工内在心理偏好和团队外在文化规范对团队合作的影响机理。首先,构建了描述源于员工内在心理偏好的内部同事压力和源于同事惩罚的外部同事压力的理论模型。然后,分析并给出了内在心理偏好和外在文化规范促进团队合作应满足的前提条件。最后,根据理论分析结果,从员工内在心理偏好塑造和外在文化规范制度建立两方面给出提高团队合作效率的建议。 In approach of behavioral game theory, this paper explores the influence mechanism of intrinsic psychological preference and extrinsic cultural norm on team cooperation. Firstly, we develop a theoretic model describing the internal peer pressure from the intrinsic psychological preference and the external peer pressure from peer sanction. Secondly, the conditions by which the intrinsic psychological preference and extrinsic cultural norm can promote team cooperation are analyzed and reached. Finally, some suggestions are offered to enforce efficiencies of team cooperation in the views of shaping psychological preference and designing system of cultural norm.
作者 魏光兴 张茜
出处 《企业经济》 北大核心 2013年第7期40-43,共4页 Enterprise Economy
基金 国家自然科学基金"基于偏好结构和群体规范互动机理的激励机制设计"(批准号:71102165)
关键词 心理偏好 文化规范 同事压力 团队合作 行为博弈论 psychological preference cultural norm peer pressure team cooperation behavioral game theory
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参考文献9

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二级参考文献12

  • 1魏光兴,余乐安,汪寿阳,黎建强.基于协同效应的团队合作激励因素研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(1):1-9. 被引量:38
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