信息不对称程度增加是否有助于投行声誉功能发挥？--基于中国创业板制度实施的证据

Does Increase of Information Asymmetry Improve the Reputation Function of Investment Banks?—Evidence Based on the Initiation of ChiNext

本文利用中国创业板制度实施导致创业板和主板IPO市场的信息不对称程度差异,实现对IPO市场信息不对称程度变化的有效计量识别,利用2009至201 1年同时为创业板及主板市场提供承销服务的投资银行承销的618个IPO样本开展实证研究。实证结果发现,创业板IPO市场信息不对称程度显著高于主板,多个变量度量的投行声誉显著降低创业板市场IPO折价率及其波动性,而在主板市场投行声誉功能不显著。创业板市场投行声誉功能为投行自身带来了更高费用收入并且也使发行公司获得更高筹资净额。

This paper took advantage of the increase of information asymmetry due to the initiation of ChiNext in order to effectively indentify the change of the extent of IPO market information asymmetry. Using a sample of 618 observation of IPO underwrited by the same investment banks in main board and the ChiNext from 2009 to 2011, we found the extent of information asymmetry is higher for ChiNext than the main board. Further study found that the investment bank reputation works mainly through its effect on the high risk issuing firms. The investment bank reputation generated high underwriting fees to the bank and raised more funds to the issuing firms.