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银行规模视角下的市场约束——基于大中型商业银行的经验研究

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摘要 在隐性保险制度背景下,选取13家大中型商业银行2001—2011年的年度数据为研究样本,实证研究了银行规模与市场约束效应的关系。研究结果表明:商业银行规模越大,对市场约束作用削弱程度越强,对银行救助难度也越大;当第一大股东为国家或国有法人时,不论银行规模如何,市场约束明显减弱;考虑规模因素时,市场约束作用与银行资本结构和上市与否之间不存在直接关系,而盈利水平与市场约束作用的关系会受隐性保险制度影响。
作者 谢懿 柯建华
出处 《经济研究导刊》 2013年第22期111-113,共3页 Economic Research Guide
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区规划基金项目(10XJA630003) 中央高校基本科研业务费项目资助(CDJSK100204)
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