独立董事津贴与公司业绩正相关吗:信号显示抑或激励?

What Does the Level_model Positive Relation between Independent Directors' Compensation and Firm Performance Mean:Signaling Effects vs.Incentive Effects?

独立董事津贴和公司业绩正相关吗?基于水平模型的回归确实显示它们之间存在显著的正向关联关系。但这一正向关联关系背后的经济逻辑是什么呢?独立董事津贴只是显示公司业绩相对好坏的信号还是发挥了激励作用呢?本文运用2002-2010年独立董事的津贴和公司业绩的数据,基于差分模型、首次引入独立董事的公司数据、董事会届次数据和换届数据的研究发现,独立董事津贴-业绩敏感度并不显著异于零,完全外生或基本外生(与独立董事努力无关)的公司业绩决定着独立董事津贴。本文的发现意味着独立董事津贴并未与公司业绩真正挂钩,公司未基于业绩的变化来调整独立董事的津贴,独立董事津贴与公司业绩在此意义上实质不相关,故基于水平模型的独立董事津贴和公司业绩之间的正向关联关系只是公司间差异所致,只是信号显示效应之结果,而非激励效应之结果。

The regression based on level model shows that the independent directors＇ compensation is positively related to firm performance. But the existing literatures have no idea about what is the underlying economic logic regarding the positive relation. Does it result from signaling effects or incentive effects？ By using the data of 2002-2010, we explore the economic logic of the relation between independent directors＇ compensation and firm performance. Based on the change model, initial introduction of independent directors data, the data of different office terms of the board of directors, we document that the independent directors＇ pay-performance sensitivity is not significantly different from 0, completely or basically exogenous firm performance determines the independent directors＇ compensation. Our findings suggest that independent directors do have not been paid for firm performance, the independent directors＇ compensation have not been truly related to firm performance, their level_model positive relation arise only from signaling effects and have nothing to do with incentive effects.