董事高管责任保险、制度环境与公司治理——基于中国上市公司盈余管理的视角

Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance,Institutional Environment and Corporate Governance-Based on the Earnings Management of Publicly Listed Companies in China

以盈余管理行为作为研究视角,采用2002年～2011年我国A股上市公司的数据,研究了董事高管责任保险、制度环境与公司治理水平之间的关系。研究发现,相对于没有购买保险的公司,购买了董事高管责任保险的公司具有更高的盈余管理程度。进一步将样本分为国内和香港交叉上市(同时发行AH股)和仅国内上市(仅发行A股)两个子样本,发现对于AH股公司,购买保险的公司具有更低的盈余管理程度,而对于仅发行A股的公司,购买保险的公司却具有更高的盈余管理程度。研究结果表明,董事高管责任保险目前尚未发挥对国内上市公司应有的治理作用。此外,董事高管责任保险的治理作用受到外部制度环境的影响。具体地,在法律和监管制度相对完善的环境下,董事高管责任保险才能发挥正向激励作用。

Using a sample of China＇ s A-share listed companies during 2002 and 2011, and from the perspective of earnings management, we examined the relationship among Directors＇ and Officer＇ s Liability （D＆O） insurance, institutional environment and corporate governance. Empirical results showed that companies that had purchased the D＆O insurance exhibited significantly higher level of earnings management. We further partitioned the sample into companies that listed on the domestic A-share only （A-share sub-sample） and companies that listed on both A- share market and HongKong market （AH-share sub-sample）. Empirical evidence suggested that D＆O insurance was positively related to the earnings management of A-share sub-sample, but was negatively related to the earnings management of AH-share sub-sample. Findings of this paper suggested that D＆O insurance failed to play a positive corporate governance role in China. Further, and the corporate governance effect of D＆O insurance was influenced by the institutional environment. Only when there is well-functioning laws and regulations can D＆O insurance exhib- it its positive effects.