摘要
作为高度专业化的市场,艺术品的定价与信息问题密切相关,但传统经济学分析工具却未能给出令人满意的解释。本文试图通过考察艺术品市场在信息经济学模型分析中的悖论,来反思其交易和运作的本质特征。艺术品市场没有出现"逆向选择"困境并非因为存在信号传递的积极作用,而是由于不可(独立)确定的艺术价值使得多数买家只能通过社会评价结果来确定所获效用大小。艺术品市场定价机制的核心在于艺术声誉的生产与交换。这一分析结果表明对艺术品市场的考察不能局限于交易过程本身,而应当关注广义的建构艺术常规的集体行动过程。
As a highly specialized market, the pricing ot art is ctosety retaLeu of information, but traditional economics analytical tools cannot provide a satisfactory expla- nation. This paper tries to explore the paradox of art market through the analysis of infor- mation economics models to reflect on the nature and characteristics of its trading and opera- tion. The absence of adverse selection in art market is not because of the active role of signal transduction, just because of the determination of utility done by the majority of buyers only through social evaluation results owing to uncertain artistic value. The production and ex- change of artistic reputation is at the very core of the pricing mechanism of art market. It im- plies that the research on art market cannot be limited in the transaction process, but should focus on broad collective process of constructing art convention.
出处
《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期19-26,共8页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
关键词
定价机制
信号传递
美学价值
艺术声誉
艺术常规
pricing mechanism
signal transduction
aesthetic value
artistic reputatlon
art convention