投资机会集、代理冲突与上市公司审计师选择——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

Investment Opportunity Set,Agency Conflict and Choices of Auditors in Listed Companies:Evidences from China’s A-Share Listed Companies

以2009-2011年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了投资机会集、所有权性质以及制度环境对上市公司审计师选择行为的影响。研究发现,公司投资机会集越高则越倾向于聘请高质量审计师以缓解代理冲突,同时由于非国有公司治理水平相对更弱,作为薄弱的公司治理机制的一种补充,非国有公司选择高质量审计师的动机更强;进一步的研究还发现处于市场化进程较慢、法治水平较低以及政府干预程度较强地区的非国有上市公司投资机会集与高质量审计师选择的正相关关系越强。

Taking China＇s A-share listed companies in 2009-2011 as samples, this paper explores the influences of investment opportunity set, ownership nature and institutional environment on the choices of auditors by listed companies. It reveals that, if the company＇s investment opportunity set becomes higher, the company is more likely to hire high quality auditors to relieve agency conflicts; meanwhile for the NSOEs, their governance abilities are relatively weaker, so the incentives of the NSOEs to choose high quality auditors are stronger, which can supplement their weak governance. The further researches also indicate that the investment opportunity set of the NOESs in the regions with lower progress of marketization, lower legal governance level, or more government interference has a stronger positive correlation with the choices of high quality auditors.