IPO超募、过度投资与公司价值

IPO Over Subscription,Over Investment and Firm's Value

与已有研究多探讨中国公司是否偏好股权融资及其原因不同,本文重点考察公司偏好股权融资的后果。以2006年至2010年首次发行股票的公司为样本,通过分析IPO超募行为,研究我国公司的股权融资偏好及其对公司长期业绩、过度投资行为和公司价值的影响。研究发现,半数以上超额融资的企业在IPO之后显示出强烈的厌恶长期负债的倾向;大多数企业在IPO时过度融资,导致存在过多的冗余金融资产,企业金融资产比重越大,IPO后业绩下降幅度越大;而且超额融资量和冗余资产比例与企业过度投资行为的概率显著正相关,与企业的未来价值显著负相关。建议在IPO公司中引进EVA的考核与奖惩机制,对大股东和管理层进行投资约束,以遏制超额融资行为。

Unlike previous studies mainly focused on the reason and preference for equity financing of Chinese companies, in this paper the study is directed to investigate its consequence. We analyze the preference for equity financing in lPO firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2006 to 2010, and the effects of that preference on redundant assets, over- investment behavior and firm＇s value. The result demonstrates that over half of IPO firms really show a strong aversion to long- term debt financing, companies over-financed from IPO hold too much redundant financial assets that lead to a lower performance. And firms＇ over investments have positive correlation with the amount of excess IPO financing and redundant assets, and the firm＇s tuture value has negative correlation with them. It is suggested that to curb the behavior of over-financing from IPO, establishing EVA assessment and bonus-penalty mechanisms in IPO firms are necessary.