交叉上市降低了控股股东与中小股东的代理冲突吗

Does Cross-listing Curb the Interest Conflicts between Controlling Stockholders and Small Stockholders

在我国新兴市场,公司代理成本主要表现为控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。A股上市公司到法律约束与信息披露环境更好的市场(同时发行H股或其他境外流通股)交叉上市是否有利于降低控股股东与中小股东的代理冲突?本文研究发现,交叉上市有利于降低控股股东控制权与现金流权分离程度及公司价值、公司业绩之间的负相关关系,在控制了交叉上市的"自选择"后结论仍然成立;进一步研究发现交叉上市能够有效约束控股股东的资金占用行为,这为前述结论提供了直接证据。

Chinese A - share listed company＇s cross - listing can effectively mitigate the negative relationship between the separation of control right and cash flow right and firm performance, even after control]Lng for the ＂self- selection problem＂, 1his ~sult shows that strict governance environment and constraint is helpful to decrease the finn＇s internal agency cost and protect the interests of small shareholders. Further research indi- cates that cross listing can effectively restrict large shareholder＇s fund occupancy and thus provide direct evi- dence and solidity check for our aforementioned result.