会计性信息不对称、新股折价与高管持股变动

The Accounting-related Information Asymmetry Help Explain IPO Under pricing and Post-IPO Managerial Ownership Changes

本文探讨新上市公司是否由于会计性信息不对称越严重,其新股折价幅度较大。同时探讨会计性信息不对称越严重时,上市后高管持股比例是否会增加。结果发现,会计性信息不对称越严重的新上市公司,其新股折价幅度较大。以上市后一年为计算期间,则会计性信息不对称越大时,新股长期性折价幅度也越大,但不显著。一般性信息不对称越严重时,新股上市折价幅度也较大。会计性信息不对称越严重的公司,其管理层可能隐瞒了不好信息,上市后高管持股比例并没有显著的增加,反而降低了。这说明,会计性信息不对称是公司上市时形成新股折价幅度与管理层内部交易的原因之一。

This paper studies the accounting- related information asymmetry help explain the magnitude of initial public offering under- pricing. Meanwhile this paper explores the relationship between the accounting - related information asymmetry and post- IPO managerial ownership changes. Empirical results show that the more serio~ accounting - related information asymmetry of newly listed company, the larger IPO under - pricing. Furthermore tests with an alternative proxy for the long term under - pricing magnitude document not significant resdt that the subsequent year under- pricing increases. Findings support that the general infor- marion asyreanetry explain IPO under- pricing. Findings also show that the company with serious accounting - related information asymmetry and management may conceal bad information not significantly appears its post- IPO managerial ownership increase, but reduce. This result documents that the accounting- related information asymmetry is one of the reasom that form IPO under- nrlcint, and insider Irading.