委托代理关系、共用资源池与宏观税负合理区间的界定

Principal-Agent Relations, Common Pool and Definition of Rational Range of Macro Tax Burden

宏观税负是公共财政文献中一再出现的主题,但很少被置于财政社会①的背景下加以讨论。本文将委托代理关系范式和共用资源池范式带入对该主题的分析中,认为确认宏观税负的合理区间只是健全财政过程的结果,而非经济分析法或参照法的产物。

Macro tax burden is a repeated theme in the literature of public finance, but it is rarely discussed under the grand background of fiscal society. This paper expands the analysis of this topic with principal-agent relationship paradigm and the common-pool paradigm. The paper argues that that rational range of macroscopic tax burden should only be regarded as results of sound fiscal process, rather than the product of economic analysis or referenced approach.