管理层权力、机会主义动机与内部控制缺陷信息披露

Managerial Power ,Opportunism Motivation and Internal Control Deficiency Information Disclosure

以深市A股主板市场2008—2011年财务重述公司为基础,利用内部控制缺陷与财务重述的因果关系确定内部控制存在缺陷的上市公司样本,本文对管理层权力与内部控制信息披露中的管理层机会主义行为之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,管理层权力越大,上市公司管理层越倾向于隐瞒已经存在的内部控制缺陷。即在当前公司治理机制弱化和内部控制缺陷认定标准模糊的背景下,管理层可能会利用其对公司的控制权影响内部控制缺陷的披露。研究还发现,相对于非国资控股公司,国资控股公司管理层更倾向于隐瞒已经存在的内部控制缺陷。这表明,要想使内部控制信息披露真正成为解决代理问题的有效手段,必须对管理层权力实施有效制衡以规范企业管理层内部控制信息披露行为。

Based on the financial restated companies during investigates the relationship between managerial power and the 2008--2011 in Shenzhen trading market, this paper managerial opportunism in internal control information disclosure. It finds that： the greater the managerial power is, the lower likely for managers to disclose the existed internal control deficiency. That is ： under the background of weak corporate governance and vague standards of internal control deficiency, CEO may affect the disclosure of internal control deficiency with managerial power. Com- pared with non-state-owned companies, it is lower likely for managers in state-owned companies to disclose the existed internal control deficiency. This paper manifests that it is necessary to counterbalance managerial power and standardize internal control information disclosure.