不完全信息的审计博弈及风险分析模型

An Audit Game and Risk Analysis Model Based on Incomplete Information

从混合审计博弈策略和不完全信息出发,研究审计期望收益及策略矩阵,分析基于被审计对象的违规倾向、利益转移的审计风险类型及关系,构建了基于不完全信息的扩展审计博弈模型.将定性分析与定量研究相结合,实现博弈策略在不完全信息和隐藏行为下的比较与选择,提高了审计博弈风险分析、策略择优的准确性和可信度.

On account of the strategy of mixed audit game model and the uncertainty of information, an extended audit game model was built based on incomplete information. Audit expected return and strategy matrix, as well as the types and relationships of audit risk based on irregular tendency and benefits transfer of the auditee were studied. Qualitative analysis and quantitative study are combined to realize comparison and selection of game strategies with incomplete information and hidden action, which improves the accuracy and the reliability of risk analysis and strategy evaluation in audit game.