基于博弈模型的我国联保贷款研究

Study on Guaranteed Loans of Commercial Banks in China Based on Game Model

我国自推行联保贷款以来,缓解了许多农户和中小企业由于自身经济实力弱及物权担保缺乏而导致的贷款难、抵押难的问题。但是,联保贷款在取得佳绩的同时还暴露出许多如联保体解体、信贷风险等问题,使其不能有效的实施。而信息不对称是导致这些问题出现的根源。主要针对根源,基于博弈模型进行分析,进而提出建议。

Since the implementation of guaranteed loans,the difficulty in loans and mortgage which are caused by weak economic strength and lack of security interests of farmers and small enterprises have been eased in China.However,while it makes achievement,many problems have been exposed gradually,such as the disintegration of guaranteed body,credit risk and other issues etc.Which is caused by information asymmetry.This article mainly analyzes the root reason of the problems based on game model,and then puts forward guiding suggestions.