基于利益相关者集体选择的企业所有权形成机理推演被引量：1

Deducing the Forming Mechanisms of Enterprise Ownership based on the Collective Choice of Stakeholders

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摘要企业所有权形成是利益相关者集体选择的结果,需经历两次集体选择过程。第一次集体选择是所有社会成员对"企业"这种经济主体所有权共识的普选过程,即宏观层面选择,其结果是形成对所有企业所有权都具有约束力的法律、法规或者规章制度等;第二次集体选择则是在第一次集体选择形成的正式规则框架下,由特定企业的利益相关者对特定企业所有权所进行的集体选择,即微观层面选择,其结果是形成多样化的所有权结构。 It is the result of collective choice of stakeholders that the forming of enterprise ownership,and needs two processes of collective choice.The first one is that all communitarian choose ownership of＂enterprise＂,that is a macro-choice,which is looked as a kind of general economic body.The result of the first choice process is the common rules about ownership to applying in all kinds of enterprises,such as laws,regulations and so on.The second one is the collective choice about the special ownership structure among the special stakeholders of the enterprise within bounds of laws and regulations,that is a micro-choice,and the result is to form variegated ownership structure.

作者王秀华

机构地区青岛农业大学经济与管理学院

出处《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第8期122-128,共7页 Commercial Research

基金国家自然科学基金项目"利益相关者集体选择视角下的企业价值管理研究" 项目编号:71172099 山东省社科规划项目"山东省上市公司经营业绩与公司治理的相关性研究" 项目编号:11DKJJ03

关键词企业所有权集体选择利益相关者 enterprise ownership collective choice stakeholder

分类号 F016 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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