IPO盈余管理动机与承销商选择决策的互动关系及监管启示——基于双边匹配模型的研究

The Interaction between IPO Earnings Management Incentive and Underwriter's Choice Decision and Regulatory Inspiration—Research Based on Bilateral Matching Model

在IPO过程中,企业的盈余管理动机与其承销商选择决策存在相互影响。本文以中小板市场为样本,通过估计企业和承销商的双边匹配模型,揭示了两个显著特征:(1)在价值最大化目标的驱动下,市场份额大的承销商与盈余管理动机强的企业形成配对关系,说明由于缺乏完善的监管约束和市场约束,采用宽松监督和认证标准的承销商反而可以获得更多客户。(2)盈余管理动机弱的企业与资产规模大的承销商配对,这是因为资产规模大的承销商其声誉受损的成本大,监督和认证的可信性强,能更好地减少投资者和企业之间的信息不对称,因而更受盈余管理动机弱的企业欢迎。本文可以为监管当局把握复杂而隐蔽的IPO盈余管理过程进而采取有针对性的措施提供参考。

In the IPO process,the company's earnings management incentive and its underwriter's choice decision affect each other.The arti cle takes the small and medium-size enterprise stock market as example,by estimating the bilateral matching model of companies and underwriters,reveals two salient features:(1) under the drive of maximizing values,underwriters with large market shares match companies with strong incentives for earnings management,indicating that due to the lack of a sound regulatory constraints and market constraints,underwriters with loose oversight and certification standards would be able to obtain more customers.(2) Firms with weak incentives for earnings management match underwriters with large-scale assets.Since the reputation cost of underwriters with large-scale assets is big,and their surveillance and certification has strong credibility,which can better reduce the information asymmetry between investors and enterprises,underwriters with large-scale assets are more welcomed by firms with weak incentives for earnings management.The article could provide a reference for regulatory authorities in grasping the complex and subtle earnings management process and then making targeted measures.