从动态博弈视角谈碳排放权价格形成与策略选择

Talking about Price Formation of Carbon Emissions Rights from Dynamic Game and Strategy Selection

运用罗宾斯泰英的轮流叫价谈判模型对碳排放权价格的形成进行分析,得出如下结论:碳排放权价格的唯一子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果取决于碳排放权买卖双方的耐心程度。而耐心程度取决于碳排放权的相对稀缺程度、流动性、碳排放权交易达不成时买卖双方的损失、碳排放权买卖双方的实力。在此基础上,探讨改善我国碳排放权价格劣势地位的策略。

This paper analyss the formation of prices of carbon emission rights, applying Rubinstein＇s turns bid negotiation model, and draws the following conclusions： only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of carbon emission rights prices depends on the patience degree of seller and buyer of the carbon emissions rights. The patience degree depends on the relative scarcity of carbon emission rights, liquidity, loss of buyer and seller when carbon emissions trading fail, the strength of buyer and seller of carbon emission rights. On this basis, the paper discussed strategies to improve disadvantage of our carbon emission rights price.