政治关系、企业超额贷款与大股东资金侵占——来自中国家族上市公司的证据

Political Relationship,Excess Credit and Controlling Shareholder's Funds Embezzlement——The Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

民营企业的政治关系作为一种替代性的非正式机制,在改进民营企业融资和促进民营企业发展方面发挥了积极作用。已有文献着重研究政治关系对资源配置结构的影响,但较少关注相应的效率问题。本文以我国2007～2009年家族上市公司为样本,实证检验政治关系对企业超额贷款形成以及大股东资金侵占的影响,从资金使用角度对政治关系与信贷资源配置效率的关系进行研究。研究结果表明,在我国银行业普遍存在"所有制歧视"的局面下,某些家族企业仍然获得了超额银行贷款,并且企业高管的政治背景强化了超额贷款的形成。但是,从家族企业债务融资的动机看,企业借助政治关联谋取超额贷款的行为并不是为了发挥债务的治理效应,而是为了控制更多的资源,以为其侵占行为提供便利。本文还发现,有政治关联的企业更可能发生侵占行为。

According to former researches,the political relation of private enterprises can be served as an informal substitute mechanism to lessen the obstruction caused by the backward system to the growth of private enterprises and to help private firms gain bank loan supports to spur their development.But they pay more attention to the relationship between political connection and the allocation of economic resources,and less attention to corresponding efficiency.Based on the sample of Family-controlled enterprises listed from 2007 to 2009,this paper examine the impact of political relation on the accessibility of excess credit and controlling shareholder＇s embezzlement of listed company＇s fund.The authors find that,facing the credit crunch,some family-controlled enterprises still obtain excess loans,and political affiliated executives aggravate the formation of excess credit;further study indicates that the motivation of family-enterprises which strive for excess credit is to control more resources so as to encroaching company＇s fund,rather than taking advantage of credit governance.The authors also find that controlling shareholders with political connection are more likely to encroach.