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匹配与市场设计:一个理论梳理及其在中国的实践——2012年诺贝尔经济科学奖成果述评 被引量:1

Matching and Market Design Theory and Its Application in China
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摘要 在现实生活中存在很多无法通过市场交易来解决的分配问题,本文通过对匹配机制与价格机制的比较研究,阐明了"好"匹配机制的关键在于模拟竞争性市场的价格机制,并进一步解释了匹配的稳定性、帕累托有效性以及防策略性产生的逻辑。本文还介绍了三种最为基本的匹配算法及其性质,并结合这些算法深入分析我国市场设计方面的实践效果,即在这些领域里我国目前采用的匹配算法的优劣及其改进方向。 Nowadays, economists' interests involve almost all aspects of human behavior, although price, monetary theory, economic growth, demand supply and other traditional economic maintain a consistent topic. Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth, the winners of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2012 ,have done the kind of work: stable matching and market design. This research topic doesn't belong to the traditional monetary problems. Instead, it pays more attention to student enrollment, marital selection, organ transplasatation, centralized distribution, etc. , which cannot introduce the price mechanism to decide the final selection in a general sense. In other words, these studies have been covered in the "market design". Known as the "market design" does not mean that the problem may be solved naturally by the "invisible hand" in the market;On the contrary, these problems proven can't use the price factors (This will be discussed in more details later in this cause), need to artificially devised an algorithm or program to achieve a stable matching by simulating the allocation functions in a perfectly competitive market, which also meets freely participate and Pareto efficiency, and several other welfare characteristic. Economists often look at markets as given, trying to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, in contrast, does not take markets as given;in recent years the field has grown dramatically - partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run. Reviewing the development of competent academic circles in China, the matching theory has been concerned for a long time, but only focused on the current student enrollment issues in the context of education reforms. For instance, using the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm to improve the poor quality of BPS ( Boston Public System), which is no basis theoretical innovation in the market design? Although there are not many theoretical literature references to the domestic, a lot of practical problems still can be examined from this perspective. Market design is both a science and an art. It is a science in that it applied the formal tools of game theory and mechanism design and it is an art because the participants of these markets are often different from how they are modeled by these theories. Many allocation problems cannot be solved through market transactions in the real world. By comparing the matching mechanism with the price mechanism, this article is to clarify the "good" matching mechanism that should simulated competitive market price mechanism, and explains the logic of stability Pareto effectiveness and strategyproof of the matching. The article describes three of the most basic matching algorithm and its properties, and uses these algorithms to analyze the practice in China. This paper,first, compares the matching mechanism to the price mechanism in order to clarify that the "good" matching mechanism is the key to simulate the price mechanism of the competitive market. Second, based on the previous study to explain the stability of the matching, the Pareto effectiveness and the logic of the emerge of the defense policy. Furthermore, we describe the three most basic matching algorithm and its properties, and make in-depth analysis of the functional effect of the market design combining these algorithms. That is, discussing the pros and cons of our current matching algorithm used in some areas, and pointing out the direction of the merits of its improvement. We really hope to check its application to the possibility of the practice and its institutional constraints, and finally to attract more attention and thinking in this field, and do some help to promote innovative theory of the reform process for the guiding role.
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第9期170-178,共9页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词 匹配与市场设计 非价格机制的分配 匹配算法 matching and market design allocation without price mechanism matching algorithm
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参考文献23

  • 1Abdulkadiroglu A, Pathak P A, Roth A E. The New York City High School Match[ J]. American Economic Review,2005, (2).
  • 2Abdulkadiroglu A, Pathak P A, Roth A E. Strategy-proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match[ R]. National Bureau of Economic Research,2009.
  • 3Abdulkadiroglu A ,Pathak P A, Roth A E, et al. The Boston Public School Match[ J]. American Economic Review,2005, (2).
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二级参考文献22

  • 1聂海峰.填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利?[J].南方经济,2006,35(6):75-89. 被引量:23
  • 2聂海峰.高考录取机制的博弈分析[J].经济学(季刊),2007,6(3):899-916. 被引量:47
  • 3Abdulkadiroglu,A.,P Pathak,A.Roth."Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences:Redesigning the NYC High School Match". . 2008
  • 4Abdulkadiroglu,A,P Pathak,A.Roth,T.S nmez."Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism". NBER Working Paper No.11965 . 2006
  • 5Gale D,Shapley L S.College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Journal of Mathematics . 1962
  • 6Abdulkadiro?lu,A,Pathak,P,Roth,A.The New York City high school match. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc . 2005
  • 7Abdulkadiro?lu,A,Pathak,P,Roth,A,S?nmez,T.The Boston public school match. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc . 2005
  • 8Abdulkadiroglu,Atila,Tayfun Sonmez.School Choice:A Mechanism Design Approach. The American Economist . 2003
  • 9Balinski,M.,S?nmez,T.A Tale of two Mechanisms: Student Placement. Journal of Econometrics . 1999
  • 10Chen,Y.,S?nmez,T.School choice: an experimental study. Journal of Econometrics . 2006

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