摘要
时间问题的关键在于:时间与空间之间的关系如何,以及它们与人类的理智或心灵有何种关系。以康德为代表的近代哲学家认为,时空的观念依赖于心灵的本性,物质的空间性被隐含地赋予了比时间更基础的地位——因为空间性作为因果范畴的根基保证了逻各斯秩序的确定性与必然性。柏格森则反对这种先验主义时间观,在他看来,时间的本性就是绵延,它意味着连续、流动、内在、多样,它与空间、测量、间断、同质等无关。他借由绵延引入了一种流变的哲学,在连续变化而又纯粹融合的时间(即绵延)中,逻各斯的序列荡然无存。这正是柏格森主义与康德的先验主义哲学在时间问题上的根本差异。
The difficulties and core of questions concerning time lie in the relationship between space and time and what relationship space and time have with the human mind. Modern philosophers such as Kant consider that the idea of space and time is somehow dependent upon the nature of the human mind. The spatiality of matter is implicitly given more fundamental role than the temporality, as the spatiality as the root of causality ensures the certainty and inevitability of the order of logos. However, Bergson objects to such transcendental view of time. According to him, the nature of time is duration (la durée), which means continuous, flowing, immanent and diverse. It has nothing to do with space, measurement, intermittence and homogeneity. With duration, Bergson introduces a kind of rheological philosophy which causes the order of logos to be vanished radically in the duration. It is just this point finally makes the fundamental differences between Bergsonism and Kantian transcendentalism.
出处
《哲学分析》
2013年第4期50-61,197-198,共12页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
2012年度国家社科基金重大项目"德国古典哲学与德意志文化深度研究"(项目编号:12&ZD126)的阶段性成果