摘要
根据一种实践的规则观,功利原则不能用于辩护特定制度之下的具体行动。将功利原则直接应用于制度本身,提供了一种看起来更为合理的功利主义版本,但这并不意味着它可以免于批判性的考察。制度功利主义有两幅面孔,一种是制度选择的决策程序,另一种是评价制度是否正义的标准。相应地,它有两种证明方式,分别是诉诸个人理性选择的类比和诉诸道德平等的论证。通过梳理罗尔斯和金里卡等人的讨论,可以看出这两种证明都存在问题。
According to a practical conception of rules, the principle of utility cannot be used to justify a particular action made in an institution. But a more plausible version of utilitarianism can be raised by applying such principle to the institution itself. Even so, it does not mean that institutional utilitarianism would be immune from a critical examination. This theory has two faces: one is regarded as a decision-making procedure that chooses institutions; and the other is a standard of justice that assesses them. Accordingly, it has two argument forms: argument by the analogy between individual and public choices and argument by ethical equality. With Rawls’ and Kymlicka’s discussions, it can be seen that both of them are problematic.
出处
《哲学分析》
2013年第4期109-119,199,共11页
Philosophical Analysis
关键词
制度功利主义
决策方式
正义标准
institutional utilitarianism
decision-making methods
standard of justice