高管控制权对公司资本结构的影响——来自国有控股上市公司的经验证据

The Effect of Executive Control Rights on Capital Structure:Evidence from State-owned Holding Listed Companies in China

基于国有企业高管控制权形成的制度背景,本文以2006年—2010年的国有控股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了高管控制权对公司资本结构的影响。研究发现,无论是高管控制权的单项指标还是综合指标,都能显著影响公司的资本结构;高管控制权强的公司其资产负债率和长期负债率都显著低于高管控制权弱的公司;当公司存在两职合一、董事会独立性较弱、监事会规模较小、高管持股、高管任期较长等现象时,对高管控制权的约束较差,此时高管出于维护自身职位的考虑更偏向于较低的负债。

Based on the background of state - owned enterprises executive control rights, this paper studies the effects of the exec- utive control rights on capital structure by utilizing the data of state - owned holding listing companies from 2006 to 2010 in Chi- na. The study finds whether single index or comprehensive index of executive control rights can significantly influence the capital structure of the company. More executive control rights of state - owned holding listing companies leads to lower the debt ratio and long - term liability ratio. When the executive dual role as the chairman of board and CEO, weak the independence of the board of directors, small the supervisory board, top management holding shares and long tenure of CEO constrain poorly on executive control rights, in order to have their power, the executives incline.