银行与B2C企业统一授信中的监督和激励研究

Study on Supervision and Motivation in Unified Credit Extension by Banks and B2C Enterprises

基于委托代理理论,凸显B2C企业在统一授信模式中信息透明的特点,在模型构建中对应引入可观测信息变量,并对比引入该变量前后的最优均衡。通过比较,发现引入可观测信息变量后银行的激励水平和B2C企业的努力水平都会提高。最后,通过算例给出了努力水平、激励水平以及期望收益的实际运用。

In this paper, on the basis of the principal-agent theory, we showed that the B2C enterprises were characterized by information transparency in the unified credit extension mode, then we introduced observable information variables into the establishment of the model and compared the optimal equilibrium of the model before and after the introduction, through which we discovered that after the introduction of the variables the level of motivation of the banks and the effort level of the B2C enterprises would increase. At the end, we presented a numerical example to demonstrate the practical application of the effort level, motivation level and expected benefit.