特许权价值、隐性保险和银行稳健性——基于中国上市银行的实证检验

Franchise Value,Implicit Insurance and Bank Stability——Based on the Empirical Test of Listed Banks in China

在对国内外相关文献梳理的基础上,选取特许权价值、隐性保险、银行规模、政府监管、资本杠杆、经营杠杆和银行稳健性的度量指标,构建计量经济模型,并采用16家中国上市商业银行2000～2011年非平衡面板数据进行实证分析。通过研究发现:特许权价值存在内生自律效应;隐性保险提供的范围涵盖各种商业银行,没有国有和非国有的差异;隐性保险削弱了特许权价值的内生自律效应;银行规模越大,稳健性越好;政府监管降低了银行风险,增强了银行稳健性;中国上市商业银行资本杠杆和经营杠杆效应没有充分发挥作用。

Based on the analysis of relative literatures of China and foreign countries,the paper constructs an econometric model by choosing several measurement indexes including franchise value,implicit insurance,bank size,government regulation,capital leverage,operation leverage and bank stability.An empirical analysis is then made by using unbalanced panel data of 16 listed commercial banks in China from 2000 to 2011.Results show that franchise value has endogenous self-regulatory effect;implicit insurance covers all sorts of commercial banks,with no difference in state-owned and non-state-owned banks;implicit insurance weakens the endogenous self regulatory effect of franchise value;the bigger the size of banks,the better the stability;government regulation decreases bank risks while strengthening bank stability;the capital leverage and operation leverage effect of Chinese listed commercial banks haven’t played full roles.