信用缺失、融资激励与小微企业发展

Credit Loss,Financing Incentive and the Development of Small and Micro Businesses

运用银行与小微企业之间的动态博弈模型,分析信用缺失导致的小微企业融资约束问题以及形成的"银行不放贷,企业不还贷"的恶性循环。针对目前中国小微企业面临严重的融资约束问题,分析四种突破小微企业融资约束的融资激励机制设计及各自存在的缺陷,并提出相应的改进思路及相关配套措施,形成新的融资激励机制,更好地实现银企之间信息对称和银行积极"放贷"、小微企业积极"还贷"的融资激励,从而缓解小微企业融资约束,促进小微企业发展。

By using the dynamic game model between banks and small and micro businesses,the paper analyzes the financing constraint problem of small and micro businesses and the vicious circle of ＂banks refuse to provide loan while enterprises refuse to repay loan＂caused by credit loss.In view of the serious financing constraint problems of small and micro businesses in China at present,the authors analyze the design of financing incentive mechanisms which aims to break financing constraint of the businesses as well as their disadvantages.Improvements and supporting measures on the mechanisms are proposed to form a new financing incentive mechanism,which will better facilitate information symmetry between banks and enterprises,improve financing incentive of active bank ＂loan lending＂and enterprise ＂loan repayment＂.In this way,the financing constraint problem of small and micro businesses will be alleviated and the development of the businesses will be promoted.