公平信息披露规则能缓解证券分析师的利益冲突吗

Can Regulation of Fair Disclosure Alleviate Analysts' Conflicts of Interest

本文从私人信息供给压力角度,研究FD能否缓解分析师利益冲突。发现FD缓解了分析师受到的来自于承销商关系和机构投资者的压力,并且这种作用在高成长性公司与低成长性公司之间,以及竞争性公司与非竞争性公司之间中存在差异。该研究结果表明私人信息供给是利益冲突的来源之一;治理利益冲突,应当确保规则的有效实施,彻底切断私人信息的供给,保障投资者获取信息的公平性,避免私人信息成为上市公司有价值的交换商品。

Regulation of fair disclosure （FD） was published on August 10th, 2006 by Shenzhen Stock Exchange mainboard. This regulation requires listed companies should disclose information to all investors fairly and publicly, forbidding leaking major non-public information to analysts, institutional investors or related media in advance. Obviously, cutting the transmitting of private information, analysts＇ forecast must be affected by FD. Most of the prior researches on economic consequences of FD paid more attention to whether FD reduces analysts＇ forecast accuracy, considering private information as a part of analyst＇ information resource have been cut. However, as a valuable exchanged commodities from public company managers, private information might force analysts to afford more optimistic forecasts as a reward, thereby might exac-erbate analysts＇ conflicts of interest. When FD cut the supplying of private information, can it alleviate analysts＇ conflicts of interest？ This paper examines this question just from the point that private information brings the pressure to analysts. Using the data of financial analysts＇ earnings forecast issued over the period 2004-2011, we find that analysts＇ forecast bias increased in post FD relative to pre- FD, analysts＇ relative optimistic forecast bias for underwritten clients and institutional awkwardness decreased in post FD, suggesting that analysts have become more independent when FD alleviates the pressure that analysts bear from underwriting business relations and institutional investors. Furthermore, we find that this function of FD is different between higher growth （competitive） and lower growth （non-competitive） companies. Among lower growth and competitive companies, the pressure from underwriting business relations is significant and FD alleviates it. But among higher growth and non-competitive companies this relationship isn＇t significant. At the same time, among all of the four groups, the pressure from institutional investors is significant and FD may alleviate it. This study gives us the chance to explore how conflicts of interest come about and it implies that private sources of interest conflicts. In information is one of the numerous order to cure conflicts of interest, regulators should cut the transmission of private information, avoid- ing private information becoming a kind of valuable exchanged commodities, safeguarding the fairness of gaining information among investors.