期刊文献+

机构投资者治理与公司现金持有价值 被引量:14

The Governance Roles of Institutional Investors and the Value of Corporate Cash Holdings
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文以中国2003—2011年间A股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察了机构投资者对企业现金持有价值的影响,研究发现,就整体层面而言,机构投资者并没有对现金持有价值产生显著的影响。然而按市场化程度高低分组来研究机构投资者的公司治理效应,发现在市场化程度较高的环境下,机构投资者持股能够显著提高公司现金持有价值;而在市场化程度较低的环境下,机构投资者持股反而损害公司现金持有价值。这一结论说明,只有在合适的制度环境下,机构投资者的积极治理效应才能得以充分发挥。这一实证结果也为中国当前正在深化的市场化改革以及实施的机构投资者战略提供了直接证据。 Based on Chinese 2003 -2011 A-stock listed companies as research samples, this empirical study studied on the effect of institutional investors on enterprise value of cash holdings and finds that, as a whole level,institutional in- vestors don' t have a remarkable impact on value of cash holdings. But as for the corporate governance effect of institutional investors according to the group based on the degree of marketization level, it is found that in the marketed environment of high degree, institutional investors can dramatically improve the value of cash holdings of the company ; While in the marke- ted environment of low degree, institutional investors may the damage value of cash holdings of the company. This conclu- sion shows that only in the appropriate system environment, the positive governance effect of institutional investors can be fully the i exerted. The empirical results also provide direct evidence for the market-oriented reform which is being deepened and mplemented strategy of the institutional investors in China.
出处 《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第8期15-27,共13页 Research on Economics and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“会计协调测定和评价的实证研究”(70472068)
关键词 机构投资者 治理效应 现金持有价值 市场化改革 Institutional Investor Governance Effect Value of Cash Holdings Market-oriented Reform
  • 相关文献

参考文献28

  • 1Shleifer A, Vishny R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94 ( 3 ) :461 -488.
  • 2Bhojraj S, Sengupta P. Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields:the Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors [ J ]. The Journal of Business,2003,76 (3) :455 - 475.
  • 3Drucker Peter F. The Unseen Revolution:How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America[ M ]. London:Heinemann, 1976.
  • 4Chen X, Harford J, Li K. Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter? [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics,2007,86 ( 2 ) :279 - 305.
  • 5王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2):27-33. 被引量:199
  • 6李维安,李滨.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究--基于CCGI^NK的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(1):4-14. 被引量:371
  • 7Pound John. Proxy Contest and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight[ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988 (20) :237 -265.
  • 8Robert Webb, Matthias Beck, Roddy Mckinnon. Problems and Limitations of Institutional Investor Participation in Corporate Governance, Institutional Investor Participation [ J ]. Corporate Governance,2003,11 ( 1 ) :65 - 70.
  • 9Gaspar J, Massa M Matos P. Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 2006 (61) :73 - 104.
  • 10唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005,3(1):63-86. 被引量:218

二级参考文献165

共引文献2986

同被引文献275

引证文献14

二级引证文献280

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部