市场化进程、代理冲突与费用粘性研究

Marketization,Agency Conflicts and Expense Stickiness

本文运用2007—2011年我国A股主板上市公司数据,基于市场化进程的制度背景,实证检验了公司两类代理冲突与公司费用粘性的关系。研究发现,公司管理层与股东的代理冲突进一步加大了公司费用的粘性程度,控股股东与中小股东的代理冲突则遏制了公司费用粘性程度。进一步研究表明,公司成本费用粘性程度受到企业所在地区市场化进程的影响,市场化进程能够降低公司费用粘性程度,缓解因一类代理冲突而产生的费用粘性程度。这一研究深化了成本费用粘性的代理成本解说,并为公司管理层自利行为损害公司有效的成本管理决策提供了实证证据。

With the year-end data （2007-2011） from A-share listed companies in China,taking the process of maketization into consideration,this paper investigates the relation between agency conflicts and the firm expense stickiness. The empirical results show that the conflicts between the management and shareholders agents propell the firm expense stickiness;while the conflicts between the controlling shareholders and small shareholders suppress the firm expense stickiness. Further studies show the expense stickiness is influenced by the marketization process of local enterprises;and the marketization process will reduce the level of ex- pense stickiness caused by the A-class agency conflicts. This study deepens the agency cost explanations of expense stickiness,and provides empirical evidence for the management to make decisions on the self-bene- fit-oriented behavior that will bring harm to the company＇s cost management.