资源型企业与相关利益主体的博弈分析

An analysis on the game between resource-based enterprises and its stakeholders

探索中央政府、地方政府在资源型企业发展过程中的作用,寻找政府与资源型企业在一定条件下的社会总福利的均衡。运用博弈论,从利益相关者的视角研究资源型企业与政府、居民,中央政府与地方政府之间的博弈问题。资源型企业拥有政府给予的权力并为政府政绩做贡献;环保企业利润最大化时的产品成本与资源型企业达到纳什均衡的排污费相等时,中央政府的社会福利最优与环保企业的利润最大具有目标一致性,由此与污染企业达到纳什均衡;地方居民多被动接受被污染的环境,居民与资源型企业的纳什均衡并不是社会福利最优的选择;地方政府与中央政府利益目标不一致的部分,将降低中央政府对资源型企业政策的效率。

Explore the impact and function of both central and local governments during the development of resource-based enterprises. Find the equilibrium of the social welfare between the government and the resource-based enterprises under certain conditions. From the stakeholder perspective, the game researched is between the resource-based enterprises, the local resident, the central government and the local government by means of the game theory. The research found that the resource-based enterprises have the power given by the government so that they have to make a contribution to the government performance. The product cost of the environment protection enterprise when it maximize its profits is equal to the sewage charges which the resource-based enterprise achieves the Nash equilibrium. The central government and the resource-based enterprise would achieve the equilibrium of the total social welfare so that this game could achieve the Nash equilibrium. As the local residents had to accept the contaminated environment passively, the equilibrium between the resident and the resource-based enterprise is not the best choice of social welfare. But the inconsistency of the profit target between the central government and local government could affect the implementation of the policy that the central government made for the resource-based enterprises.