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基于供应链低碳化的政府及企业行为博弈模型 被引量:8

A Game Model for the Government's and Enterprises' Behavior Based on Low-Carbonization Supply Chain
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摘要 以低碳化供应链为背景,分析了政府征收碳税对企业减排行为的影响,建立了政府及企业间的行为决策模型。采用逆向求解的方法,首先政府制定碳税税率,其次企业设定最优减排率,再次企业制定产品价格。研究发现,碳税的征收对企业减排起到有效的激励作用,伴随着税率的逐年增加,减排率由4.02%增加到20.21%,而产品的价格波动较小;消费者的低碳偏好主要影响产品定价而对制造商减排呈递减趋势。最后,通过数值分析对模型进行验证,拟为政府及企业的战略决策提供技术指导和数据支持。 Based on low-carbonization supply chain, the effects of levying carbon tax on enterprises' emission reduction behavior are analyzed and a game model between them is developed. The converse method is used to solve this problem. By this method, first, the government initiates the carbon tax rate, then, the manufacturers make the decision on the optimal rate of emission reduction ; and third the manufacturers set the prices of products. It shows that levying carbon tax plays a positive role in promoting the enterprises to reduce the carbon emission. With the carbon rate tax increasing year by year, the emission reduction are increased drastically ( from 4.02% to 20.21% ) , while the prices are changed slowly. The low-carbon preference of consumers has significant effect on the product prices, but not on the emission reduction. A numerical case is presented to test the effects of the variation for different factors. The results provide technical guidance and data support for the government and manufacturers to make strategy decision.
作者 李媛 赵道致
出处 《工业工程》 北大核心 2013年第4期1-6,27,共7页 Industrial Engineering Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072155)
关键词 低碳经济 碳税 碳减排 博弈模型 low-carbon economy carbon tax carbon emission reduction game model
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