控制权私利、多元化经营与公司价值

Private Benefit of Control、Corporate Diversification and Market Valuation

采用掏空性的关联交易衡量控股股东的控制权私人收益,探讨了控制权私人收益对多元化经营与公司价值关系的影响,以及这种影响是否因政府控制性质及市场化进程不同而存在差异。研究发现:(1)控制权私人收益攫取水平较高时,对多元化经营与公司价值的负面影响较为显著;(2)政府控制性质没有加剧控制权私人收益对多元化经营与公司价值的影响;(3)市场化进程程度越低,控制权私人收益对多元化经营与公司价值的负面影响越强;(4)随着投资者法律保护程度的加强,法治化水平的改进在提高多元化经营价值效应的同时,还抑制了控股股东攫取私有收益对多元化经营与公司价值的负面影响。

Unfair operating related party transactions is adopted to measure the private benefits of control, the paper investigates the effect of the private benefits of control on the value of corporate diversification and difference from the quality of governmental control and marketing process. We find： （ 1 ） the higher the controlling shareholder grab, the significant negative relation between corporate diversification and market valuation is. （2）the quality of governmental control over corporate doesn＇ t deteriorate the controlling shareholder＇s propping behavior on the relationship between corporate diversification and market valuation. （3） the lower marketing process improve, the significant negative relation between corporate diversification and market valuation is. （ 4 ） legalization development is propitious to improve the value of corporate diversification and restrains the negative influence of the controlling shareholder＇s propping behavior on the value of corporate diversification.