终极控制人两权分离、信息不对称与股票收益波动——来自2007—2010年中国上市公司的经验证据

Separation of Cash Flow from Control of Ultimate Controller,Information Asymmetry and Stock Return Fluctuation——Experience Evidence from the China A-listed Company during 2007 to 2010

基于现实中股权结构相对集中的资本市场背景,利用2007—2010年沪深证券市场上市公司数据,分析我国上市公司终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离程度与股票收益波动性的关系,从信息不对称角度考察终极控制人价值侵占对外部市场投资者的影响。研究发现,终极控制人两权分离程度越大,股票收益的波动性则越强,表明终极控制人的侵占行为可能导致企业与市场投资者间信息不对称程度增加,提高外部投资者的风险;同时,相对于国有上市公司和股权集中度较低的公司,非国有上市公司和股权集中度较高的公司终极控制人两权分离程度与股票收益波动性的关系更加显著,说明不同所有权性质或者不同股权集中度企业终极控制人的侵占模式和侵占力度存在较大的差别。因此,应加强和完善对大股东侵占的治理,以有效提高资本市场的效率。

Based on the capital market background of relative concentration of equity structure, by using the data of listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2007 to 2010, this paper analyzes the relationship of the separation of cash flow right from control of ultimate controller in China＇ s listed company and stock return volatility, and examines the influence of value invasion of ultimate controllers on outside market investors from the perspective of information asymmetry. The research finds that the bigger the two rights of ultimate controllers separate, the stronger stock return volatility is, which indicates that the invading behavior of ultimate controllers may lead to the increase of information asymmetry between enterprises and market investors, increasing the risk of outside investors, meanwhile, relative to state-owned listed companies and the companies which have low equity concentration, there is more obvious relation between stock return volatility and the extent of the two right separation of ultimate controllers for private listed companies and the listed companies which have high equity concentration, which reveals that there is big difference of invading mode and invading capacity between the ultimate controllers of the companies with different ownership or with different equity concentration. Thus, China should consolidate and perfect the regulation on the invasion of big shareholders to effectively improve capital market efficiency.