外包生产中的双边道德风险与线性契约设计

The Bilateral Moral Hazard in the Production of Outsourcing and Its Corresponding Linear Contract Design

为应对合作产品开发中的双边道德风险问题,对制造商设计报酬契约进行探究。分别从信息对称与信息不对称两个方面,纳入供应商的风险规避系数、双方各自的努力成本系数等因素,运用Stackelberg博弈规划模型优化求解。研究发现通过激励系数可实现制造商与供应商之间产品收益转移,并通过固定补贴费用满足供应商参与开发的保留利润。

On the basis of compensation contract about collaboration in product development with the double moral hazard model,it establishes the model for the risk-neutral manufacturer and risk-averse supplier.Taking the efforts of the supplier and the efforts of the manufacturer in account,it defines the coefficient in the contract of the profits between the manufacturer and the supplier.And making a fixed payment can ensure to meet the supplier’s reservation profits.It analyzes the design of the contract under the case of symmetric information and asymmetric information,describes the effects made by the coefficient of risk aversion,the cost coefficient of the supplier’s efforts and the cost coefficient of the manufacturer’s efforts on the contract under the case of asymmetric information.