摘要
研究垂直整合对下游企业创新激励机制的潜在影响。结果表明,垂直整合导致市场排斥,一体化企业创新投资增加,独立的下游企业创新投资减少;垂直整合后一体化企业的联合利润增加。
This paper studies the potential effects of vertical integration on downstream firms'incentives to innovate. The result shows that : a vertical merger replicates the effect of input foreclosure ; it leads the integrated firm to invest more in innovation, and the independent firm to invest less. It increases the joint profit of the merging parties at the expense of the down- stream independent rival.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第8期100-103,共4页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD100)
西南大学博士基金项目(SWU09022)
关键词
垂直整合
排斥
创新
模仿
vertical Integration
foreclosure
innovation
imitation