期刊文献+

考虑心理情绪因素的风险企业价值及投资决策分析 被引量:4

The Influence of Psychological and Emotional Factors on the Venture Enterprise Value and Investment Decision-Making
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摘要 在双边道德风险框架下的最优努力程度模型的基础上,讨论了风险企业家和风险投资家的心理情绪因素对风险企业价值和投资决策的影响,结果表明:风险企业家和风险投资家的适度自信都能够抵消道德风险的影响,风险企业家过度自信的心理会导致风险企业价值降低,但可能使净收益为负的风险企业得到投资,风险投资家的过度自信会使得风险投资家在投资决策中存在过度反应;风险企业家的消极保守也会使得风险企业价值降低且可能使净收益为正的风险企业遭到拒投,风险投资家的消极保守会使得他在投资决策中反应不足。 This paper, based on the optimal effort model for double - sided moral hazard, discusses the influence of the venture entrepreneurs' and venture capitalists' psychological and emotional factors on the venture enterprise value and the investment decision - making. And it turned out that moderate confidence of entrepreneurs and investors are able to offset the impact of moral hazard. Overconfidence of entrepreneurs may lead to lower corporate value, but may make the venture enterprise with a negative NPV get investment, while overconfidence of investors may cause overreaction in investment decision - making. Negative and conservative psychology of entrepreneurs may also lower corporate value and make the venture enterprise with a positive NPV refuse to invest, also that of investors may make them react to investment decision - making insufficiently.
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第8期104-109,共6页 Soft Science
基金 中国博士后基金项目(2012M521685) 成都市软科学项目(12RKYB164ZF-002)
关键词 风险企业 心理情绪 过度自信 双边道德风险 the venture enterprise psychological and emotional factors overconfidence double -sided moral hazard
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