摘要
公共工程腐败是我国工程建设领域的突出问题,具有明显的负外部性。阐述了廉洁公约的要件和公共工程常见的腐败行为,将廉洁公约引入公共工程腐败治理,基于混合博弈理论,按照腐败参与主体的不同分别构建两方静态博弈模型和三方静态博弈模型。分析表明廉洁公约能够提高腐败成本,增大查处概率,进而有效预防公共工程参与方的个体腐败和共谋腐败,从理论上证实了该制度创新的内在合理性。并对廉洁公约在我国公共工程中的实施提出相应的政策建议。
Corruption in public projects is a major problem in China＇s construction sector and has exhibited strong negative external diseconomy. The article explicates the major components of integrity pact （IP） and the common corruption behaviors in public projects. By introducing IP to anti-corruption in public projects, this article constructs two different models according to different types of corruptions： two-partner static game model and three-partner static game model. The analysis reveals that lP has a positive effect in preventing the individual corruption and collusion by increasing the cost of corruption and the rate of investigation, therefore proves its internal rationality theoretically. Policy recommendations are also put forward for the effective implementation of IP.
出处
《工程管理学报》
2013年第4期36-39,共4页
Journal of Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71073091)
关键词
廉洁公约
公共工程
腐败行为
混合博弈
integrity pact
public projects
malversation
mixed game theory
