银行治理、高管薪酬与银行绩效

Bank Governance, Executive Pay and Bank Performance

本文基于中国11家上市商业银行2006-2011年面板数据，研究银行治理、高管薪酬与银行绩效三者之间的关系。研究发现，银行治理与银行绩效互为显著正相关；银行绩效与高管薪酬亦互为显著正相关，二者存在“激励相容”，且这种“高报酬—好业绩”双向激励机制在非国有性质的商业银行中尤为明显；对更高高管薪酬和绩效水平的银行而言，这种“激励相容”作用显著变弱。通过研究银行治理细分变量对银行绩效的影响后发现，股权结构对绩效存在负作用，董事会、独立董事、监事会等对银行绩效提升作用不明显，对银行治理和内部制衡机制功能发挥需要给予重视。

Based on the panel data of the Chinese 11 listed commercial banks during 2006-2011, this paper researches the relationship between bank governance, executive pay and bank performance. It is found that the bank governance and the bank performance are significantly and positively correlated with each other, so do the bank performance and the executive pay, which means there is ＂incentive compatibility＂; such bilateral incentive mechanism as＂more pay, better performance＂ is especially ob- vious in non-state-owned commercial banks, but such ＂incentive compatibility＂ function obviously becomes weak in the banks of the higher executive pay or better performance. The study of the influence of finely-sorted variables representing bank gover- nance shows that the shareholding structure has negative impacts on the performance, and the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors haven＇t obviously improved the bank performance. It＇s necessary to pay attention to bringing the functions of the bank governance and the internal balance mechanism into play.